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NOTES AND COMMENT
$7.00 per acre. Sheldon rescinded the contract and a new contract
was made setting the price at $8.00 per acre. Afterwards Sheldon
discovered the fraud and refuse to go on with the bargain. Kelly had
made part payment and sued to compel Sheldon to perform the contract.
It was held that Kelly could not compel specific performance of the con-
tract but that the court would do complete equity and hence Sheldon
must return the money he had received.
In Wells v. Mitletk, 23 Wis. 64, the circuit court refused specific
performance of a contract to convey lands in exchange for a barge
and a half interest in a steamboat. The owner of the steamboat made
false representations regarding the financial responsibility of his part-
ner and these were held sufficiently fraudulent to be a defense against
specific performance.
Again in Engberry v. Rousseau, 117 Wis. 52, specific performance
was refused and the opinion of Chief Justice Ryan in Williams v.
Williams, 50 Wis. 311, is cited, "A court of equity must be satisfied
that the claim for a deed is fair, just, and reasonable, and the contract
equal in all its parts, and founded on an adequate consideration before
it will interpose with this extraordinary assistance. If there be any
well founded objection on any of these grounds, the practice of the
court is to leave the party to his remedy at law for compensation in
damages."
Hence, we can conclude that in Wisconsin "Specific performance of
a contract will not be decreed in favor of a party who has been guilty
of misconduct in making the contract and that the rule as stated by
Chief Justice Marshall in Cathcart v. Robinson" is at present the law
in Wisconsin. "Omission or mistake in the agreement or that it is
unconscientious or unreasonable or that there has been concealment,
misrepresentation, or any unfairness, are enumerated among the causes
which will induce the court to refuse its aid?
JOHN WALSH"
Joint Stock Companies: Joint Adventures: Limitation of Actions.
Reinigethal v. Nelson, et al., Wis., Sup. Ct., Oct., 1929, 227 N.W. 14
is an action on a note by trustees of the estate of the deceased against
Nelson and others of a syndicate formed to purchase lands in Montana.
The members of the syndicate signed an agreement by which two of
them were designated trustees who were to take title to the land and
were given power "to enter into all contracts necessary to carry this
agreement into effect." The trustees were governed by the decision of
8 5 Pet. 264, 270, 82 Ed. 120, 124.
'Quotation taken from Eaton on Equity (2nd. Ed.) PP. 501.
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a majority in interest of all the parties to the contract. The land was
taken subject to $8,000 worth of mortgages. When these became due
the trustees were directed to make, execute, and deliver the $8,000 note,
that is here in suit, to replace the obligations when due. When that
note became due the trustees gave three notes for one, two, and three
years each, for the interest due. When due the first note was not
paid; when the second came due, Handt, a trustee, borrowed on his
personal note and placed that sum in the syndicate fund which was then
used to pay the two interest notes then due. Plaintiff brought suit
on the $8,000 note more than six years after it was due but in less
than six years after the two notes were paid, making all syndicate mem-
bers parties defendant. The trial court held that all signers were liable
on the note when it was given but the six year statute of limitations
protected them; that the payment of interest was made out of Handt's
own funds and not by direction of the members of the syndicate, and
therefore the statute of limitations protected them. However Handt
and Supple are liable for the entire note; Handt, because of his pay-
ment of interest, and Supple, because he didn't plead the statute of
limitations. The executrix of the estate of Handt appealed, and the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed and vacated the judgment, re-
manded the case, and directed that all of the signers be held liable on
the note.
The court decided that a syndicate to purchase lands under an agree-
ment granting powers to trustees and without a president or capital
stock of fixed value was not a joint stock company.1 That renders
inapplicable section 286.04 of the statutes, requring one to exhaust
remedies against a joint stock company before proceeding against in-
dividual members in view of section 286.06, providing that process
should be served on the president thereof. In this case all of the
signers of the note were served.
Parties to the syndicate to purchase lands appointing two members
as trustees for all were held to be joint adventurers. "Essentially there
is little difference between a partnership and a joint adventure; the
latter as a rule being more limited and confined in its scope principally
to a single transaction."'2 That being a case where one party owned
lots and the other, being a builder, built houses on them, and they agreed
to share equally in the balance of the net profits, such, involving both
profit and loss, constitutes a joint adventure in the nature of a partner-
ship.
Members of the syndicate formed to purchase lands under agree-
'Wis. Stat. 286.04-286.06.
' 184 Wis. 266.
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ment investing trustees with power are liable on a note executed by
the trustees covering mortgages on land purchased. The trustees who
signed were agents of all of their associates in the giving of the note.
They were all liable unless such liability had been extinguished by
the running of the statute of limitation.
3
Generally, each joint adventurer may bind others in matters strictly
within the scope of joint enterprise. "Where a party to a joint ad-
venture acts fairly and in good faith he is not liable for the whole but
only for his share of the losses of the adventure." 4 The protection of
the property of the syndicate was strictly within the scope of the joint
enterprise. The court felt that Handt should not be held liable for this
entire debt because he used his own credit to protect the interests of
the syndicate, instead of asking the members to raise the necessary
funds.
The relationship between joint adventurers forming a syndicate to
purchase lands has many of the essential elements of a partnership.
The courts do not treat them as being identical, but they are governed
by practically the same rules. ". . . It is immaterial whether we treat
the parties as coadventurers or as copartners. In either event each
would be the agent of the other.' 5
Payments by one joint adventurer even after the joint adventure has
ended, before the limitations have run, tolls the statute to all. Wis-
consin adopted the rule that each partner is the agent of all his partners
in making payments upon firm obligations and that part payments by
one partner, even after the dissolution of the firm before the statute
has run, "forms a new point from which the statute begins to run as to
all of the partners."- In this regard the power of a joint adventurer
is the same as that of a partner, this case falling clearly within the rule
as to partners which prevails in Wisconsin. So, payment by one mem-
ber of the syndicate of interest on the notes of the syndicate to protect
the interests of all the members tolled the limitations as them all.
Section 330.44 of the statutes, which provides that a payment by
one joint contractor shall not toll the running of the statute as to the
other joint contractors who did not join in making such payment, has no
application to this case. "There are incidents, rights, and liabilities, of
a partnership which make the members of the firm in such case more
than mere joint contractors. ' 7 "As to matters pertaining to the partner-
ship business, the act of one of the members of a firm is the act of all,
'Wis. Stat. Chaps. 330, 190.
'15 R. C. L. 505.
170 Iowa 57, 152 N.W. 43.
'Clement v. Clement, 69 Wis., 599.
' Clement v. Cleinent supra.
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and a part payment of a partnership debt by one partner will have the
same effect against the others as against the one who makes it.8
COSMAs B. YOUNG
Landlord and Tenant.
Lincoln Fireproof Warehouse Co. v. Gruesel, et. al.," was an action
by the Lincoln Fireproof Warehouse Company against Sylvester C.
Gruesel and others, trustees of the Home Wiring Company. The facts
are stated thus: on March 1, 1924, the plaintiff, a corporation, as lessor,
leased to a corporation known as the Home Wiring Company premises
in the City of Milwaukee known as No. 330-332 Third Street, for a
term of three years, in consideration of certain stipulated rentals per
annum, payable in monthly installments, in advance. After having
occupied the premises up to February 6, 1925, the Home Wiring Com-
pany executed an assignment in writing to the defendants, as trustees,
for the benefit of its creditors, of all its property, including its interest
in the said lease. The defendants paid the rentals becoming due
monthly, up to December 1, 1925; and some time between December
1 and December 11, 1925, the defendants abandoned and vacated the
demised premises, and refused to abide by the provisions of the lease.
Thereafter, the plaintiff took possession of the leased premises, and at-
tempted to relet them in mitigation of damages, but without success.
Reargument was ordered in this case, because the appellant asserted
that the rule adopted in Selts Investment Co. v. Promoters,2 and Strauss
v. Lynch demanded a reconsideration of the facts presented. Those
cases declared it to be the duty of the landlord to take possession of
the premises abandoned by the tenant, and to use reasonable diligence
in reletting the same, in order to minimize damages. The former rule
set forth in a previous Wisconsin case4 held that by resuming possession
in order to perform his duty to the tenant, the landlord accepted sur-
render of the premises by the assignees, releasing them from further
liability to pay rent.
Justice Stevens in his opinion said the court concluded that this re-
sult presented no ground for a modification of the former decision.
While the assignees -were in privity of estate, they were obligated to pay
the rent as set forth in the lease. The original lessee was also liable,
because he had contracted to pay to the end of the term. The assignees
8Harding v. Butler, 156 Mass., 34, 30 N.E. 168.
'227 N. W. 6; - Wis. -.
2197 Wis. 476, 485; 222 N.W. 812.
'197 Wis. 586; 222 N.W. 811.
"224 N.W. 98; - Wis. -.
